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Comment  Otmar Issing
This chapter by A. Alesina, S. Ardegna, and V. Galano—in short, AAG—
is indeed a triple-  A contribution. It addresses an important aspect of the 
European Monetary Union (EMU) and brings together economics and po-
litical considerations to explain policy choices. The authors go the hard way 
of detailed empirical work, scrutinize a myriad of data, and remain careful 
in their interpretation.
To start with, EMU in the end was a political decision. Economists 
around the world were more or less skeptical. Their fundamental concern 
was an obvious lack of ﬂ  exibility in the economies of potential member 
states, and as a consequence, in the future monetary union. For example, 
on February 9, 1998, 155 German academic economists published an open 
letter entitled “The Euro Is Coming Too Early”—the main reason being the 
lack of ﬂ  exibility in labor markets (and insuﬃcient progress in consolidating 
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public ﬁ  nances).1 And it was in the ﬁ  rst weeks after the establishment of the 
European Central Bank (ECB) when I received a letter by Milton Friedman 
saying, “Dear Otmar, congratulations on an impossible job. You know I am 
convinced, monetary union in Europe is doomed to fail.”
In short, a clear majority of economists pointed to the fact that a mon-
etary union with the envisaged large membership—eleven countries ﬁ  nally 
to start on January 1, 1999—would be far from fulﬁ  lling the criteria of 
an optimal currency area (OCA). But, the project of monetary union, the 
ambition to be allowed to participate, and after entry, the need to adapt to 
the new framework of a single monetary policy—“one size ﬁ  ts all”—and 
the removal of the tool of national monetary policy and changes in the 
exchange rate of the national currency strengthened structural reforms and 
ﬁ  scal consolidation.
The conditions for entry enshrined in the Maastricht treaty—at least for-
mally—referred only to nominal variables. The discipline exerted by these 
criteria in some cases came late, but all in all, it was timely enough. The threat 
of not being in at the start of EMU unleashed unexpected forces, including 
the sphere of ﬁ  scal policy—admittedly with grave exemptions as regards 
public debt levels.2
But what about structural reforms, progress toward greater ﬂ  exibility in 
product and labor markets? The authors identify two layers of a potential 
impact of EMU.
One is (dis)qualiﬁ  ed by AAG as “wishful thinking”—the rhetoric that 
“any step toward integration is ‘by deﬁ  nition’ good and brings about all 
sorts of wonderful achievements for the continent.” Strange as it might 
sound for an economist, this “philosophy” of integration—or what it may 
be called—played for some time an important political role under the label 
of the “monetarist” position. This was based on the expectation that once 
the exchange rate was ﬁ  xed irreversibly, the rest would adjust in a mysteri-
ous way.
The other line of argument refers to the fact that monetary union elimi-
nates the option of strategic devaluations, or more generally of adjusting 
policy rates to national cyclical conditions, and therefore enforces pressure 
for enhancing the ﬂ  exibility of labor markets and wage bargaining.3
In this context, AAG mention that not surprisingly, the pre-  euro debate 
initially focused on labor market reforms. The eﬀect on product markets 
comes mainly from increasing costs of regulation due to stronger compe-
tition.
1. See Issing (1996).
2. Issing (2008).
3. A few authors argued that the disappearance of the exchange rate risk would lead to a 
higher demand for protectionism and thereby weaken the incentives for structural reforms. 
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To what extent are the criteria of OCA endogenous? What is the impact of 
EMU on concrete steps for more ﬂ  exibility in product and labor markets?
Here, AAG are confronted with a tremendous identiﬁ  cation problem. The 
authors concentrate their empirical study at a one-  shot event—the intro-
duction of the euro. The diﬃculties to isolate this eﬀect from the rest of the 
environment are obvious—and fully recognized by the authors:
1.  The process of globalization has created incentives for reforms world-
wide.
2.  The introduction of the euro is not just exogenous. Countries discussed 
pros and cons and adapted to the common currency for diﬀerent reasons, 
which could have also aﬀected incentives for structural reforms.
3. The  eﬀect of the introduction of the euro preceded the start of EMU. 
As soon as it became a common conviction that EMU would begin as agreed 
in Maastricht on January 1, 1999, risk premia in foreign exchange mar-
kets started to decline, and preparation for participation reached a decisive 
phase.
4.  The observation period still is rather short—further impact might be 
in the pipeline.
5.  Finally, and most importantly: is it possible to disentangle the eﬀect of 
participation in the single market from the introduction of the euro?
The main result of their empirical study can be summarized in two sen-
tences:
1. The adoption of the euro had a signiﬁ  cant eﬀect in promoting the 
adoption of product market reform, especially in some sectors. Here, one 
is tempted to argue that the impact should rather be in general terms (i.e., 
comprise structural reforms on a broad macrolevel). So, are sectoral reforms 
more due to sectoral speciﬁ  cs than to the introduction of the euro?
2. For labor market reform, the euro did not have much of an eﬀect. 
Here, one may caution a bit. For example, the euro may have contributed 
to the major labor market reforms that were implemented in Germany in 
2004 and early 2005.
The authors are also convinced that the sequencing of reforms should 
follow this pattern.
I will not try to evaluate the statistical method applied, nor to go through 
the myriad of details. While the data are impressive, it would help if the 
authors could try to consolidate their results.
The AAG chapter sets a landmark in extracting information from their 
model on an issue of highest importance for the functioning of EMU. Over-
all, their results are consistent with those of other studies. In the meantime, 
the European Commission has published its “EMU@10” special report 
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The evidence is not very conclusive, but it is clear that on balance the single 
currency has had little positive eﬀect on the pace of structural reform4. . . . 
Consistent with these ﬁ  ndings, the analysis . . . indicates that euro-  area 
countries have on average been less forthcoming in implementing the 
structural policy recommendations made to them by the EU under the 
Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs)—a Treaty-  based tool for 
economic policy coordination—in the period 2000–  2005. In particular, 
progress in the cross-  border integration of services has been more muted 
than expected, which is particularly problematic. It is in this area espe-
cially that price rigidities persist. This has been recognised by . . . the 
European Commission, which in turn has led to intensiﬁ  ed surveillance 
of national structural policies in the euro area in the framework of the 
Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs, which was revamped in 2005. (22)
A paper by Pelkmans, Montoya, and Maravelle (2008) shows that prod-
uct market reforms do help to “lubricate” adjustment processes in the euro 
area.5
Where Is EMU Going?
Notwithstanding the remaining lack of ﬂ  exibility, especially in labor mar-
kets, the single monetary policy has worked with great success—certainly 
better than even the optimists had expected. This result might trigger a new 
discussion on the relevance of the OCA criteria. Financial integration might 
have played a role. Consumption smoothing and risk sharing should have 
contributed to the functioning of EMU.
On the other hand, signiﬁ  cant challenges are ahead. Countries that con-
tinuously have lost competitiveness inside the euro area are confronted with 
heavy adjustment problems, and the slowdown of growth will reveal the 
lack in ambition on structural reforms throughout the euro area. The costs 
of the current ﬁ  nancial crisis for the real economy will to a large extent 
depend on the ﬂ  exibility of labor and product markets—in particular, on 
(downward) ﬂ  exibility of labor costs and prices. In my book The Birth of 
the Euro (2008), the title of the last chapter, “Europe at the Crossroads,” is a 
kind of short- cut message. The there- is- no- alternative (TINA) to structural 
reforms hypothesis remains true if the coherence of the area is to be pre-
served and the functioning of the single monetary policy guaranteed. The 
alternative is anything but promising: increasing tensions—economically 
and politically—with far-  reaching consequences.
4. Duval and Elmeskov (2006) see no acceleration of reforms in EMU. A slowdown in 
reforms in 1999 to 2004 relative to 1994 to 1998 is reported by Duval (2006).
5. Pelkmans, Montoya, and Maravalle (2008).The Euro and Structural Reforms    9 7
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